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Introduction 
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue 
Code excludes from gross income "the 
amount of any damages received . . . on 
account of personal injury or sickness." 
Originally enacted in 1918, the provision is 
almost as old as the modem federal income 
tax system. According to the committee re-
port on the original legislation, the exclu-
sion was enacted because it was "doubt-
ful," under existing law, whether such dam-
ages were required to be included in gross 
income. In other words, the Committee per-
ceived the statutory exclusion as a mere 
clarification of existing law. 
Courts have broadened the concept of 
gross income significantly since 1918, but 
the statutory exclusion for personal injury 
damage awards has survived. Absent the ex-
clusion, most damage awards would consti-
tute gross income under the modem defmi-
tion. Thus, the original exclusion was based 
upon what now appears to be an erroneous 
assumption. To the extent that the original 
reasoning no longer supports the exclusion, 
a search for alternative reasons is appropri-
ate. One might first ask whether there is arty 
basis in "tax theory" for excluding personal 
injury damage awards from gross income. If 
no such basis can be found, the inescapable 
conclusion is that the exclusion is a tax sub-
sidy- a benefit supported, if at all, by poli-
cy considerations. To the extent Sec. 
104(a)(2) represents a tax subsidy, an inqui-
ry into the reasons for and consequences of 
the subsidy is appropriate. 
Tax Theory 
Gross income, according to Sec. 61, in-
cludes "all income from whatever source 
derived" unless another provision specifi-
cally excludes the item in question. Section 
104(a)(2) is, of course, such a specific ex-
clusion. While the existence of Sec. 
104(a)(2) traditionally has been justified as 
a humanitarian gesture, more logical explan-
ations occasionally have been offered. As il-
lustrated below, the proffered explanations 
either rest on erroneous assumptions or do 
not justify a blanket exclusion. 
Return of Capital 
The most familiar justification for the ex-
clusion from gross income of personal in-
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jury damage awards is that the recipient is 
merely being "made whole" by the award 
(see Hawkins v. Comm'r, 6 BTA 1023). In 
tax parlance, being "made whole" is view-
ed as a return of capital. For example, a tax-
payer buys a share of stock for $100 and 
later sells the same share for $100, the tax-
payer has no gross income because she is 
only recovering her original investment. Re-
covery of one's original investment is what 
is meant by "return of capital." 
The return of capital analysis is appeal-
ing, especially in the case of damages 
awarded for loss of a limb or organ. This 
type of injury graphically illustrates the con-
cept of "human capital" (see Solie. Mem. 
1384, 1920-2 CB 71, for an articulation of 
the "human capital" concept). The problem 
with this analogy is that a return of capital is 
excluded from gross income only to the ex-
tent of the taxpayer's basis in the capital. A 
taxpayer's basis in property is generally the 
amount paid for the property (Sec. 1012). 
Any receipt in excess of the taxpayer 's basis 
constitutes a taxable gain (Sec. 1001(a)). 
Thus, in the example above, if the taxpayer 
pays $100 for stock and sells it for $150, the 
taxpayer realizes a $50 taxable gain. How-
ever, in the personal injury context, a tax-
payer 's basis is zero because a taxpayer 
generally does not pay for his limbs or or-
gans. The recipient of a personal injury 
damage award is being "made whole" in 
the same sense that the taxpayer selling her 
stock for $150 is being made whole- by 
receiving the full value of what is being giv-
en up. Like the taxpayer selling her stock, 
the personal injury plaintiff should be al-
lowed to exclude only that portion of the 
award that represents recovery of an actual 
investment of capital. If the taxpayer's basis 
in the "capital" cannot be established, no 
part of the award can accurately be called a 
return of capital. Actually, it is unnecessary 
to speculate about whether a taxpayer has a 
basis in the various parts of his body. A per-
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sonal injury award does not pay a taxpayer 
for the damage to his or her body per se; 
rather, the taxpayer is compensated for con-
sequent economic loss (i.e., lost earnings) 
and, in some instances, pain and suffering. 
Such compensation clearly falls outside the 
scope of the return of capital concept, since 
no capital is being exchanged for the award. 
Involuntary Transaction 
Even if the plaintiff's recovery cannot ac-
curately be characterized as a return of capi-
tal, one might be tempted to conclude that 
the damage award should not be taxed be-
cause of the involuntary nature of the trans-
action. After all, the plaintiff did not choose 
to be injured. The existence of other Code 
provisions that grant special status to "in-
voluntary gains" might be cited in support 
of this conclusion. Specifically, Sec. 1033 
allows a taxpayer to postpone recognition of 
a gain resulting from an involuntary conver-
sion of property in certain circumstances. 
Normally, if the taxpayer's property is de-
stroyed and the taxpayer is compensated for 
the destroyed property (by insurance or oth-
erwise), the taxpayer will recognize a gain 
to the extent the compensation exceeds the 
basis of the property. If the taxpayer invests 
the compensation in replacement property, 
however, Sec. 1033 allows recognition of 
the gain to be postponed until the taxpayer 
disposes of the replacement property (Sec. 
1033(b)). 
Section 104(a)(2) might appear to be 
analogous to Sec. 1033, but there are two 
important differences. First, Sec. 1033 does 
not render the gain from an involuntary con-
version non-taxable. Rather, it merely al-
lows recognition of the gain to be post-
poned. Second, in order to qualify for defer-
ral under Sec. 1033, the taxpayer must in-
vest the compensation for the destroyed 
property in replacement property. By con-
trast, Sec. 104(a)(2) provides an absolute 
exclusion rather than a mere deferral. More-
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over, the exclusion is not dependent on the 
taxpayer's use of the award; she may spend 
the money any way she likes. If would seem 
that the personal injury plaintiff is more like 
the employee who is wrongfully discharged. 
The employee did not ask to be fired, and 
his firing may have been a breach of the 
contract under which he was employed, but 
the employee is free to spend his damage 
recovery however he sees fit and, thus, must 
include it in gross income (see Hodge v. 
Comm'r, 64 TC 616, but see Metzger v. 
Comm' r, 88 TC 3000). 
Imputed Income 
The Internal Revenue Service and the 
courts have been reluctant to extend the 
concept of gross income to include so-called 
"imputed income." The generally accepted 
definition of imputed income is the "flow of 
satisfactions from durable goods owned and 
used by the taxpayer, or from goods and 
services arising out of the personal exertions 
of the taxpayer on his own behalf. " For ex-
ample, if the taxpayer, a mechanic, repairs 
his own car, he is enjoying the fruits of his 
labor. In an economic sense, the taxpayer 
has realized an accession to wealth. While 
such income arguably could be taxed, as a 
general rule it is not. 
Damage awards sometimes represent 
compensation for the loss of what would 
have been imputed income. For example, if 
a husband is disabled as a result of an acci-
dent and his wife is awarded damages for 
the loss of the husband's household serv-
ices, the damage award is a cash substitute 
for imputed income that would have been 
enjoyed tax free. Thus, it could be argued, 
logic requires that the damage award also be 
enjoyed tax free. While this is indeed the 
treatment under Sec. 104(a)(2), it is far from 
clear that logic requires such a result. It is 
generally agreed that imputed income es-
capes taxation for practical rather than logi-
cal reasons. Specifically, difficulty in defm-
ing and valuing imputed income are the 
main obstacles to its taxation. It appears that 
these obstacles are removed when imputed 
income is reduced to cash. Thus, while dam-
age awards sometimes represent a substitute 
for non-taxable imputed income, it does not 
follow that such awards should be excluded 
from gross income on that basis. 
Administrative Considerations 
In addition to the theoretical justifications 
discussed above, certain administrative con-
siderations are served by the exclusion of 
damage awards from gross income. These 
considerations are discussed below. 
Bunching of Income.- A damage award 
often results in the plaintiff receiving a 
lump-sum income that otherwise would 
have been received over a number of years. 
This is especially true of awards compensat-
ing the plaintiff for loss of earning capacity. 
It might be asserted that it is unfair to sub-
ject such an award to the progressive rate 
structure of the federal income tax, since the 
bunching usually forces the recipient into a 
higher marginal rate bracket. This problem 
is avoided, of course, if the award is not tax-
ed at all. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 low-
ered the maximum marginal income tax rate 
for individuals from 50% to 33% and re-
duced the number of rate brackets from 13 
to three. These changes greatly reduce the 
perceived unfairness associated with bunch-
ing of income. To the extent that such un-
fairness continues to exist, some type of rate 
relief through averaging seems a more ap-
propriate remedy than wholesale exclusion 
from gross income. 
Medical Expenses.- It may be argued 
that, if damage awards were taxed, plaintiffs 
incurring large amounts of medical ex-
penses would be saddled with tax liability in 
excess of their ability to pay. Assume, for 
example, that plaintiff is injured and incurs 
$20,000 in medical expenses. If plaintiff's 
$20,000 recovery is taxed, he or she will not 
have enough to pay both the tax liability and 
the medical bills. The deduction for medical 
expenses provided by Sec. 213 is of no help 
here, because medical expenses are not de-
ductible if they are "compensated for by in-
surance or otherwise." Apparently, the tax 
character of the reimbursement is irrelevant 
(see Litchfield v. Comm'r, 40 TC 967, aff'd, 
330 F.2d 509). Thus, even if the damage 
award were taxed, Sec. 213 would not allow 
a deduction for the medical expenses. 
Obviously, the medical expense problem 
is avoided by excluding the recovery from 
gross income. If the recovery were taxed, 
however, the problem also could be avoided 
by amending Sec. 213 to provide that a tax-
able reimbursement of medical expenses 
will not preclude a deduction of those ex-
penses. 
Since the deduction for medical expenses 
cannot exceed adjusted gross income for the 
year in which the expenses are paid, a tim-
ing problem could result if the expenses 
were paid in a year other than the year in 
which the recovery is received (and, under 
our supposition, taxed) . For example, if 
plaintiff recovers a lump sum in year 1 to 
cover future medical expenses, the medical 
expenses might exceed plaintiff's income 
for the years in which they are paid. Thus, 
even if the expenses are otherwise deduct-
ible (as a result of the amendment suggested 
above), the deduction would be of no use to 
plaintiff. A similar problem could arise if 
plaintiff pays the expenses in year 1 (pre-
sumably with borrowed money) and recov-
ers the award in year 2. This problem does 
not arise, of course, if the recovery is ex-
cluded from gross income. (In some situa-
tions, taxpayers have been able to exclude 
the reimbursement from gross income and 
deduct the expenses (see Niles v. U.S., 710 
F.2d 1391).) If the recovery were taxed, add-
ing a carryover-carryback feature to Sec. 
213 would eliminate the potential problem. 
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Justification as a Tax Subsidy 
The preceding discussion demonstrates 
why the exclusion of personal injury dam-
age awards from gross income cannot be 
justified as a logical application of tax the-
ory. To the extent that such a justification is 
lacking, the exclusion should be evaluated 
as a tax subsidy. That is, a Congressional 
decision to forego revenues that otherwise 
would be due. Although Congress appar-
ently did not originally intend the exclu-
sion to be a subsidy, it functions as such in 
the context of modem tax law. 
A tax subsidy is an indirect but very real 
expenditure of public funds, Congress (at 
least in theory) having determined that 
such an appropriation serves the public in-
terest. Typically, tax subsidies are provided 
to encourage particular activities that are 
deemed to be "desirable." For example, by 
allowing accelerated depreciation deduc-
tions, Congress has provided an incentive 
for manufacturers to invest in buildings 
and equipment, which in tum stimulates 
the general economy. Other tax subsidies 
represent government assistance through 
reduced tax liability to taxpayers finding 
themselves in unfortunate circumstances. 
Section 165(c)(3), for example, allows tax-
payers to deduct certain casualty losses 
that would otherwise be nondeductible per-
sonal losses. 
The exclusion provided by Sec. 1 04(a)(2) 
compensates tort victims by allowing re-
ceipts that logically should be included in 
gross income to escape taxation. While an 
expenditure of government funds for the 
benefit of innocent tort victims has emo-
tional appeal, a closer inspection of the 
ramifications of the subsidy reveals that it 
is not a wise investment of public re-
sources. As explained below, the subsidy is 
not fairly allocated. More importantly, 
government subsidization of injuries is 
contrary to sound tort policy. 
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Allocation of the Subsidy 
Assuming, for the moment, that it is de-
sirable for the government to subsidize tort 
feasors, tort victims, or both, it should go 
without saying that such a subsidy should be 
administered fairly and allocated consis-
tently among those who qualify for its bene-
fits. However, several recent developments 
indicate that the subsidy is not administered 
fairly and consistently. Rather, it is allocated 
in a haphazard fashion that surely would not 
be tolerated in the context of a direct gov-
ernment expenditure. 
Roemer and Threlkeld: Definition of Per-
sona/Injury.- In order to be excluded un-
der Sec. 104(a)(2), damages must be 
awarded on account of a "personal injury." 
As is often the case, it has been up to the 
courts to defme the parameters of the term. 
The necessity of judicial interpretation is 
not unusual, nor is it an appropriate reason 
for criticizing a statute. However, two recent 
cases illustrate the possibility of incon-
sistent interpretations arising out of other-
wise meaningless differences in state law. 
In Roemer v. Comm'r (716 F.2d 693), the 
Ninth Circuit, reversing the Tax Court (79 
TC 398), held that Sec. 104(a)(2) excludes 
from gross income damages awarded in a 
defamation suit, even though the award rep-
resented compensation for injury to the 
plaintiff's professional reputation. The tax-
payer was defamed by an inaccurate credit 
report issued in connection with his applica-
tion for an agency license from an insurance 
company. The Tax Court had held that the 
award was taxable because it represented 
compensation for injury to the taxpayer's 
professional reputation rather than his per-
sonal reputation. In reaching its decision, 
the appeals court set out an impressive ex-
position on the history of California's defa-
mation law. On the basis of this historical 
background, the court concluded that defa-
mation is a personal injury in California. 
Therefore, damages awarded in such an ac-
tion are excluded from gross income for 
purposes of federal income tax. 
While the result in Roemer may be cor-
rect, the court's reliance on state law is trou-
bling. Unfair results are inevitable if, as the 
Roemer court held, federal tax conse-
quences tum on state Jaw labels. A plaintiff 
in state X whose case is factually identical 
to Mr. Roemer 's and who recovers the same 
amount of damages might be denied the 
benefit of Sec. 104(a)(2) simply because 
state X does not label the plaintiff's injury 
as "personal." 
The Tax Court appeared to follow 
Roemer in James E. Threlkeld (87 TC 
1294). To its credit, the Tax Court empha-
sized that the label applied by state law is 
not determinative of whether a cause of ac-
tion is based on a personal injury. Neverthe-
less, the court analyzed local law and in fact 
reached its conclusion based on its review 
of state law (Tennessee). 
In light of Threlkeld, the Ninth Circuit's 
Roemer opinion cannot be dismissed as an 
isolated example of mistaken analysis. 
Whether the potential for inconsistent re-
sults inheres in the statute or results from 
mistaken interpretation, the problem does 
exist. Nor is the problem limited to the 
courts, as the following discussion demon-
strates. 
Revenue Ruling 84-108: Punitive Dam-
ages.- According to the IRS's position, the 
exclusion of Sec. 104(a)(2) does not extend 
to punitive damages (Rev. Rul. 84-108, 
1984-2 CB 32). While commentators gener-
ally agree that the IRS's position is, in theo-
ry, a correct interpretation of the law, the 
difficulty of distinguishing punitive from 
compensatory damages can lead to unusual 
results. Revenue Rul. 84-108, the vehicle 
for the announcement of the IRS 's position, 
illustrates the potential for inconsistent re-
sults arising out of state law differences. 
The ruling concerns payments received by 
the personal representatives of corporate 
employees who were killed in accidents in-
volving corporate aircraft. In order to re-
ceive the payments, which were funded by 
an insurance company by arrangement with 
the employer, the personal representatives 
were required to release any potential 
wrongful death claims against the employer. 
The ruling addresses identical facts arising 
in two different states and concludes that a 
payment in lieu of damages recoverable un-
der Virginia law is excludable, while a pay-
ment in lieu of damages recoverable under 
Alabama law is not excludable. The IRS 
based the distinction on the fact that dam-
ages under the Alabama wrongful death act 
are determined solely on the basis of the de-
gree of fault on the part of the defendant and 
thus are "punitive" in nature. Virginia law, 
on the other hand, provides for damages to 
be determined according to the actual loss 
suffered by the decedent's survivors. Thus, 
damages received under Virginia law are 
not punitive and therefore are excluded 
from taxation by Sec. 104(a)(2). 
While Rev. Rul. 84-108 dramatically il-
lustrates the potential for unfair results un-
der Sec. 1 04(a)(2), its analysis rests on 
firmer ground than that of Roemer and 
Threlkeld. In Roemer and Threlkeld, the 
courts applied state law to defme "personal 
injury" -the words of a federal statute. In 
Rev. Rul. 84-108, the term "personal in-
jury" was not in question. Starting from the 
admittedly supportable assumption that Sec. 
104(a)(2) excludes damages intended to 
compensate the plaintiff but not damages in-
tended to punish the defendant, the ruling 
looks to state law simply to determine the 
nature of the damages. The analysis is rigid, 
but unlike the analyses in Roemer and 
Threlkeld, it cannot be called incorrect. 
Thus, even if Roemer and Threlkeld can be 
dismissed as erroneous, Rev. Rul. 84-108 
leads to the conclusion that a correctly inter-
preted Sec. 104(a)(2) sometimes yields un-
fair results. 
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Evidence and Jury Instructions.- In-
structing the jury as to the tax treatment of a 
damage award presumably would have an 
effect on the amount of the award. For ex-
ample, if the jury awards the plaintiff $1 
million, believing that the plaintiff will have 
to pay tax on the award, it could be assumed 
that the jury would award something less 
than $1 million if instructed that the award 
is tax free (see Domeracki v. Humble Oil & 
Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245). If at least part 
of the award constitutes a replacement for 
lost earnings, the size of the award would 
also be affected if the defendant is permitted 
to introduce evidence of the tax the plaintiff 
would have paid on those earnings. In other 
words, the defendant would want the award 
to be based on the plaintiff's "take home 
pay," while the plaintiff would prefer an 
award based on his "gross pay." 
In lawsuits arising under state substantive 
law, state law determines whether a defen-
dant is entitled to introduce evidence on 
taxes and have the jury instructed that an 
award is non-taxable. Not surprisingly, the 
results are inconsistent from state to state, 
but courts in most states do not allow in-
structions to juries concerning the tax treat-
ment of potential awards. The rationale be-
hind the rule is that a jury instructed to fmd 
the actual amount of a plaintiff's damages 
would not normally be expected to go be-
yond the given instructions and increase its 
award to cover the plaintiff's perceived tax 
liability (Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. 
Liepelt, 444 U.S. I490). Moreover, a jury 
may fmd that predicting future tax conse-
quences is too complicated. The minority of 
state courts that have allowed evidence and 
instructions on taxability offer the converse 
rationale, for example, absent such evidence 
and instructions the jury might erroneously 
calculate the amount of the award, and, be-
lieving the award to be taxable, inflate the 
amount of the verdict to cover that pre-
sumed liability. It causes no harm, the courts 
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reason, to dispel any possible misconcep-
tions about the taxability of the award (see 
Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 
F.2d 284). 
In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Lie-
pelt (cited above), the Supreme Court held 
that an Illinois trial court erred in refusing to 
allow evidence of tax liability on lost wages 
and a jury instruction on the non-taxability 
of a potential award under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act. The Court observed 
that absent such evidence and instructions, 
jurors would be likely to arrive at an erro-
neous damage award and further inflate the 
amount of the award to take into account the 
presumed tax liability. Two dissenting jus-
tices argued that allowing such evidence 
amounted to appropriation for the defendant 
a subsidy intended for the plaintiff, and that 
the jury instruction would unnecessarily 
confuse the jury. 
Since the Liepelt decision involved a fed-
eral cause of action, it is not binding for 
lawsuits based on state Jaw. The extent to 
which state courts will follow the Court's 
lead remains to be seen, but it is unlikely 
that a uniform approach will evolve. As 
long as different states employ different 
rules, the potential exists for widely varying 
results. In the Liepelt case, for example, the 
original award was $775,000, while the cor-
rect amount, under the Court's analysis, ap-
parently would have been $138,000. As dis-
cussed below, the result is unsatisfactory un-
der both Liepelt and the majority of state 
courts' approach. Even if it is assumed that 
one approach or the other can be deemed 
"correct," and that Sec. 104(a)(2) serves a 
worthwhile purpose, the potential for such 
wild variation in verdicts solely because of 
local rules of evidence and procedure sug-
gests that Sec. 104(a)(2) does not serve its 
purpose effectively. 
Niles v. U.S.: The Double Subsidy.- As 
explained above, medical expenses are de-
ductible except to the extent the taxpayer is 
reimbursed for those expenses (Sec. 
213(a)). If the award or settlement allocates 
a specific amount to past or future medical 
expenses, the amount allocated to past med-
ical expenses is included in the plaintiff's 
gross income to the extent the plaintiff de-
ducted the expenses when they were origi-
nally paid (Reg. Sec. 1.213-1(g)(l)). Future 
medical expenses will be deductible only to 
the extent such expenses exceed the amount 
allocated to them in the award (Rev. Rul. 
75-232, 1975-1 CB 94). 
Problems arise when the award or settle-
ment is a lump sum with no allocation 
among the various components. The IRS's 
position is that a portion of the settlement 
must be allocated to medical expenses on 
the basis of all the facts and circumstances 
(Rev. Rul. 79-427, 1979-2 CB 120). Once 
the appropriate amount has been deter-
mined, the tax consequences are the same as 
outlined above. The Ninth Circuit rejected 
the IRS's position in Niles v. U.S. (710 F.2d 
1391). In Niles, the taxpayer had recovered 
a $25,000 verdict against the City of San 
Rafael, California, as a result of an injury 
sustained on the school playground, and a 
$4,000,000 verdict against the hospital that 
was allegedly negligent in treating the in-
jury. The jury did not allocate its verdict 
among the various components, but on ap-
peal the taxpayer presented an itemization 
of the award in response to the defendants' 
claim that the award was excessive. 
That hypothetical itemization allocated 
$1 ,588,176 to future medical expenses and 
attendant care. In a later year, when the tax-
payer claimed a deduction for those ex-
penses, the IRS denied the deduction be-
cause the expenses had been compensated 
for by the award. The district court (520 F. 
Supp. 808) held that the medical expenses 
were fully deductible, and the court of ap-
peals affmned, stating "[m]edical expenses 
of a taxpayer are not 'compensated for' 
within the meaning of . .. [Sec.] 213(a) 
by any portion of a previous lump-sum per-
sonal injury award." 
The Niles holding results in a double sub-
sidy for the taxpayer. The award is excluded 
from gross income, and the expenses the 
award compensates for are deductible. Set-
ting aside the question of whether a subsidy 
for medical expenses is appropriate, subsi-
dizing them is a waste of public funds. 
Nevertheless, such a result is inevitable un-
less the IRS's position is followed. The 
problem with the IRS's position, as pointed 
out by the Niles court, is that it requires 
speculation as to what portion of an award 
represents compensation for medical ex-
penses. The Ninth Circuit's rule, on the oth-
er hand, creates the potential for radically 
different results for similarly situated tax-
payers solely on the basis of whether the 
jury itemizes its verdict. The problem could 
be solved by taxing the award and allowing 
a deduction for the medical expenses, even 
though "compensated for," provided the 
compensation is included in gross income. 
Tort Policy 
The primary function of the tort system is 
cost allocation. In appropriate circum-
stances, the cost of an injury is shifted from 
the injured party to the party causing the in-
jury. Presumably, the party causing the in-
jury passes the cost on to its customers, em-
ployees, and other constituents. This alloca-
tion of cost has the secondary effect of regu-
lating conduct. In theory, if the accident 
costs associated with an activity exceed the 
benefits derived from the activity, people 
will find a safer way of engaging in the ac-
tivity or abandon it altogether. This line of 
analysis is suggested by the definition of 
negligence in U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co. 
(159 F. 2d 169), which suggests that conduct 
is negligent if the cost of a potential injury, 
multiplied by the likelihood of that injury 
occuring, exceeds the burden of taking pre-
cautions adequate to prevent the injury. 
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Regardless of whether one subscribes to 
the interpretation of this standard as a law of 
economics, it must be conceded that the tort 
system discourages reckless conduct and 
encourages the safest manner, within rea-
son, of carrying out worthwhile activities. 
The following discussion explores the im-
pact of Sec. 104(a)(2) on the cost allocation 
and regulatory functions of the tort system. 
As outlined above, a personal injury dam-
age award represents an accession to wealth 
not inherently different from any other and 
therefore logically should be included in 
gross income. Accordingly, taxation of the 
award will be treated as the "correct" result 
and used as a basis for evaluating various 
alternative results that are possible under the 
present rule of excluding the award from 
gross income. 
Let us assume that a plaintiff has been in-
jured as a result of a defendant's negligent 
conduct. The plaintiff's lost wages, lost 
earning capacity, and pain and suffering 
have a total value of $100,000 (the plain-
tiff's medical expenses will be disregarded 
on the assumption that a deduction under 
Sec. 213 would offset any inclusion in gross 
income). If the jury awards the plaintiff 
$100,000, plaintiff's wealth has been in-
creased by $100,000 and defendant has been 
assessed with the cost of the injury he caus-
ed. Since the plaintiff has been enriched, he 
should pay tax the same as if he had earned 
the money. For simplicity, a 28% rate will 
be assumed. Thus, the plaintiff will owe 
$28,000 in tax, leaving plaintiff with 
$72,000, the proper "after tax" recovery. 
Situation #1 - The Typical Result under 
Current Law 
On the facts outlined above, the result un-
der current law is that the plaintiff gets to 
keep the entire $100,000 instead of paying 
$28,000 in tax. The cost to defendant, 
$100,000, is the same. Plaintiff is receiving 
an extra $28,000, which ultimately comes, 
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of course, from the federal government. 
This is objectionable for a number of rea-
sons. First, allowing the federal government 
to contribute toward the cost of injuries is 
contrary to the basic premise of tort law: 
that the party negligently causing the injury 
should bear its cost. If the public desires a 
government-funded accident insurance pro-
gram, Congress should address the idea di-
rectly. A subsidy to the plaintiff also creates 
economic distortions. First, the plaintiff is 
being told that $10 of compensation for lost 
wages is worth $14 of income earned on the 
job. This is economically unsound. In addi-
tion, if an injury with a true after tax eco-
nomic value of $72,000 will net an after tax 
return of $100,000, the $28,000 premium 
adds an incentive to pursue questionable 
claims. Finally, if an injury will yield com-
pensation in excess of the actual loss, there 
is, at least in theory, an economic incentive 
to become an accident victim. 
Situation #2- The Jury Inflates the Award 
to Cover Imaginary Taxes 
Let us assume the same facts outlined 
above except that the jury, erroneously be-
lieving that the award will be taxed, in-
creases the award to $139,000 to allow for 
the taxes. Now, the plaintiff, who should 
end up with $72,000 after taxes, walks away 
with $139,000 tax free. Of the extra 
$67,000, the defendant pays $39,000 and 
the federal government pays $28,000. The 
message to the plaintiff is the same as in 
Situation #1, only louder. The plaintiff now 
learns that $10 of compensation for lost 
wages is worth $19 of wages earned on the 
job, or, put another way, sitting at home in-
jured for one month pays the same as work-
ing for two months. The incentive to pursue 
questionable claims and the premium on be-
coming an accident victim are correspond-
ingly increased. 
On the other side of the equation, the de-
fendant is now being charged $139,000 for a 
$100,000 injury. Although the extra $39,000 
was not intended to be a punitive damage 
award, it functions as one. If this scenario is 
repeated often enough, the defendant will be 
driven out of business without economic 
justification. 
Situation #3- The Jury Reduces the Award 
Because It Is Tax Free 
Once again, let us assume that defendant 
has negligently caused a $100,000 injury to 
plaintiff. This time, however, assume that 
the jury knows its award is tax free and 
therefore reduces the award to $72,000 on 
the theory that the plaintiff is receiving an 
indirect subsidy of $28,000 from the federal 
government. Under this scenario, plaintiff 
walks away with the correct amount -
$72,000. The defendant, however, has caus-
ed a $100,000 injury and is paying only 
$72,000. Quite simply, the jury has taken 
the $28,000 government subsidy away from 
the plaintiff and given it to the defendant, 
converting the Sec. 104(a)(2) exclusion into 
a pure, government-funded insurance pro-
gram. This conversion frustrates the regula-
tory function of the tort system. When the 
cost of an accident to the defendant is re-
duced through a government subsidy, the 
economic incentive to avoid an accident is 
reduced. In legal terms, the standard of care 
is lowered. 
Situation #4- The Award Is Taxed But the 
Jury Erroneously Assumes It Is Tax Free 
Finally, one should consider what hap-
pens if the award is taxed, but the jury erro-
neously assumes that it is tax free and there-
fore reduces the amount of the award. As 
outlined above, the "correct" result is 
achieved if the award is taxed and the jury 
ignores tax considerations in arriving at the 
amount. Under that scenario, the defendant 
pays the full cost of the injury and the plain-
tiff gets to keep his or her "fair share." If, 
however, the award is taxed and the jury 
reduces the amount believing it is tax free, 
the situation is as egregious as any of the 
other possibilities discussed above. Using 
the same dollar amounts, if the jury found 
that the defendant caused $100,000 worth of 
damages, but reduced the award to $72,000 
thinking it was tax free, the defendant would 
pay less than the "correct" amount. As stat-
ed above, reducing the cost of the accident 
to the defendant reduces the standard of 
care. At the same time, the plaintiff is not 
adequately compensated. Instead of the cor-
rect recovery of $72,000, the plaintiff is left 
with only $51,840 after tax. Besides the un-
fairness of undercompensation on an indi-
vidual basis, repeated undercompensation of 
plaintiffs would reduce the incentive to sue 
and thus frustrate the regulatory function of 
the tort system. 
The preceding examples illustrate that re-
gardless of how the jury deals with the tax 
character of a non-taxable award, economic 
distortions and frustrations of tort policy are 
inevitable. The inescapable conclusion is 
that an exclusion of damage awards from 
the gross income is fundamentally unsound 
from a tort policy standpoint. (At least one 
commentator has suggested that repeal of 
Sec. 104(a)(2) would no doubt lead to larger 
verdicts and higher insurance premiums.) 
Even if awards were taxed, distortions 
could still result if the jury were not proper-
ly instructed. In the case of a taxable award, 
the logically correct instruction would be 
none at all, since tax considerations should 
be ignored. This assumes, however, that the 
jury will not engage in misguided specula-
tion as to tax consequences. The potential 
consequences of such speculation, as illus-
trated above, warrant a cautionary instruc-
tion to the jury that they should not consider 
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the effect of income taxes in arriving at the 
amount of the award. 
Conclusion 
The exclusion of personal injury damage 
awards from gross income is inconsistent 
with established principles of taxation. Dam-
age awards cannot accurately be charac-
terized as a return of capital. Nor does the 
involuntary nature of the transaction justify 
the exclusion. While so-called imputed in-
come is not taxed, the reasons supporting its 
non-taxability do not extend to damage 
awards representing a cash substitute for such 
income. Excluding damage awards avoids 
certain administrative problems that may oth-
erwise arise, but those problems could be re-
solved by less drastic means. 
Absent a logical explanation based on tax 
theory, the exclusion of damage awards must 
be viewed as a tax subsidy - a decision 
(conscious or otherwise) to forego revenue 
that otherwise would be due. Because of defi-
nitional, evidentiary, and choice of law prob-
lems, the subsidy afforded by Sec. 104(a)(2) 
is unfairly administered. More importantly, 
government subsidization of accident costs is 
inconsistent with tort policy objectives. 
There appear to be few, if any, valid rea-
sons for the existence of Sec. 104(a)(2). The 
reasons for its repeal appear numerous and 
persuasive. If damage awards were taxed, the 
policy goals of the tort system would be ad-
vanced rather than frustrated, since defen-
dants would not be under-penalized and 
plaintiffs would not be overcompensated. In 
order to assure this result, however, juries 
should be cautioned to ignore tax conse-
quences in determining the amount of 
awards. 
[Editor's Note: In regard to an area of the tax code related to the "personal 
injury award exclusion," it should be noted that the Technical and Miscella-
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neous Revenue Act of 1988 provides that a personal injury liability assign-
ment is treated as a qualified assignment notwithstanding the fact that the 
recipient is provided creditor's rights against the assignee greater than those 
of a general creditor. No amount is currently includable in the recipient's 
income solely because the recipient is provided creditor's rights greater than 
those of a general creditor. (See TAMRA Sec. 6079, striking Code Sec. 
130(c)(2)(C) and amending Code Sec. 130(c).)] 
